Abstract: Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth is: "Truth is the agreement of cognition with its object". In this paper, I analyse the relevant features of Kant's theory of definition in order to explain the meaning of that claim and its consequences for the vexed question of whether Kant endorses or rejects a correspondence theory of truth. I conclude that Kant's claim implies neither that he holds, nor that he rejects, a correspondence theory of truth. Kant's claim is not a generic way of setting aside a correspondence definition of truth, or of considering it uninformative. Being the nominal definition of truth, the formula "truth is the agreement of cognition with its object" illustrates the meaning of the predicate "is true" and people's ordinary conception of truth. True judgements correspond to the objects they are about. However, there could be more to the property of truth than correspondence.
Introduction
An aspect of Immanuel Kant's philosophy on which there is wide disagreement among scholars is what conception of truth Kant actually had. Various expressions he used suggest that he adhered to a correspondence theory of truth. For instance, a well-known passage in the Introduction to Transcendental Logic in the Critique of Pure Reason has: "[t]he nominal definition of truth, namely that it is the agreement of cognition with its object, is here granted and presupposed" 1 . In this passage, Kant uses the term "cognition" to designate a truth-bearer. Other passages call truth-bearers "judgements". * For valuable comments on previous drafts of this paper, I would like to thank Elisa Caldarola, Hans-Johann Glock, Philip Stratton-Lake, and Gabriele Tomasi. The paper benefited from helpful criticisms of audiences at Amsterdam and Reading. 1 "Die Namenerklärung der Wahrheit, daß sie nämlich die Übereinstimmung der Erkenntniß mit ihrem Gegenstande sei, wird hier geschenkt und vorausgesetzt" (A 58 Alternative interpretations of Kant's conception of truth generally argue as follows. Kant sometimes relates truth to the correspondence of judgements with objects. However, those statements cannot be the basis of Kant's Critical conception of truth. This is because, transcendental idealism is a form of idealism or of antirealism, and only realists can subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth. Kant's conception of truth is to be defined in the following terms. A judgement is true if it coheres with the laws that the mind follows when it organizes the deliverances of the senses into a world of objects, and if it is supported by the deliverances of the senses. Endorsing a view along these lines, Kant could be a coherence theorist, a verifiabilist, an assertabilist, or he could subscribe to a combination of such theories. 2 A particular issue on which there is disagreement among the interpreters is Kant's stance towards the formula "truth is the agreement of a cognition (or a judgement) with its object". I shall call it "the agreement formula". Scholars generally agree that, for Kant, the agreement formula is the nominal definition of truth. 3 However, they have given the most diverse explanations of what this means. For those who deny that Kant has a correspondence theory of truth, his claim that the agreement formula is the nominal definition of truth is a generic way of minimizing its importance; 4 it means that the agreement formula is correct, but uninformative; 5 or it is "a rather tortuous and implicit way of rejecting such a 10 In my view, the study of Kant's theory of definition allows one to precisely understand the meaning of Kant's claim that the agreement formula is the nominal definition of truth. In this paper, I will highlight the relevant features of Kant's theory of definition, in order to explain the meaning of Kant's claim and its consequences for the vexed question of whether Kant had or rejected a correspondence account of truth.
I will argue for the following view. Kant's claim that the agreement formula is the nominal definition of truth is not a way of setting aside the correspondence formula, or of considering it irrelevant and uninformative. For Kant, to say that the agreement formula is the nominal definition of truth is to say that the agreement formula illustrates the meaning of the predicate "is true", and the content of people's ordinary conception of truth, but it does not provide any test for distinguishing true judgements from false judgements. The fact that the agreement for- mula is the nominal definition of truth implies that true judgements correspond to the objects they are about. However, there could be more to the property of truth than correspondence: Kant's endorsement of a correspondence nominal definition of truth does not rule out belief in other theories of truth.
I will argue for this view in Section 4. Before that, I shall provide some information on Kant's theory of definition in Section 2. In Section 3, I will illustrate the relevant features of nominal definitions. My interpretation relies on the works that Kant published, on his notes on logic, and on the transcripts of his lectures. 11 I will not dwell on the relationship of Kant's view with Locke's distinction between nominal essences and real essences, or with the distinctions between nominal definitions and real definitions by Kant's predecessors and contemporaries. There were very diverse conceptions of definitions, nominal definitions, and real definitions in Kant's environment. 12 Kant's view is irreducible to any of them.
Throughout this paper, I will follow Kant's linguistic usage in calling truth-bearers "judgements" and "cognitions". I will use these two terms interchangeably. 
The Features of Definitions
The section of the Doctrine of Method of the first Critique on definitions begins with an explanation of the verb "to define": "[a]s the expression itself reveals, to define properly means just to exhibit originally the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries" 13 . Logic transcripts characterize a definition as a "logically perfect concept", that is, a "distinct, complete, and precise concept" 14 . More accurately, definitions are distinct, complete, and precise expositions of concepts. 15 They are judgements which exhibit the content of concepts. Other texts indicate three more features of definitions: originality, truth, and reference to an object. 16 Before explaining what these features mean, I need to introduce some elements of Kant's theory of marks.
For marks. 19 They are partial representations, because they jointly constitute the content of complex concepts. For instance, the concept philosopher could have among its marks human being, seeker of wisdom, animal, and rational. Marks are grounds of cognition of concepts because, in order to know the content of a complex concept, one needs to know which marks it has. Marks are either necessary, or contingent. "Necessary marks cannot be separated at all from the concept of a thing". 20 To separate a mark from a concept means to deny that it belongs to that concept. The concept b is a necessary mark of the concept c if one cannot deny with a true judgement that an object which falls under c has the feature designated by b. If b is a contingent mark of c, one can deny with a true judgement that an object which falls under c has the feature designated by b. For instance, old and human being could both be marks of John's concept of philosopher. One can deny with a true judgement that a certain philosopher is old, hence old is a contingent mark of John's concept of philosopher. One cannot deny with a true judgement that a philosopher is a human being, hence human being is a necessary mark of philosopher. 21 Necessary marks are either mediate, or immediate. Given a complex concept c, some of its necessary marks are also marks of other necessary marks. Kant calls them mediate marks. For instance, animal and rational are marks of philosopher, but they are also marks of human being, which is in turn a mark of philosopher. Hence, animal and rational are mediate marks of philosopher. A mark of c which is not in turn a mark of a mark of c is an immediate mark of c. Necessary immediate marks are called essentialia. Necessary mediate marks are called attributa. 22 The essence of a concept, or logical essence, is "the complex of all marks that first constitute a certain concept" 23 . It is the conjunction of all its essentialia, or, on a more liberal reading, the conjunction of all its essentialia and attributa. 24 Kant, as we shall see, the content of our concepts does not always capture the most basic features of the items which fall within their extension. The essential marks of our concept of water might not designate the essential features of water. As a consequence, the essence of concepts should not be mistaken for the essence of things, or real essence. Real essence is "the primary inner ground of all that necessarily belongs to a given thing" 25 . Now we can turn to Kant's list of the features of definitions. The first feature is distinctness. A concept is clear to someone if one is conscious of the difference between that concept and some other concept. 26 A concept is distinct to someone if its marks are clear, that is, if one is able to distinguish its marks from each other. 27 A definition is distinct if it distinguishes, or enumerates, the marks of a concept.
Kant mentions two types of distinctness: extensive distinctness and intensive distinctness (also called profundity or thoroughness [Gründlichkeit] ). A concept is extensively distinct to someone if one is able to distinguish its essentialia. A concept is intensively distinct to someone if one is able to distinguish its essentialia and attributa. 28 A definition should be extensively distinct, but it should not be intensively distinct. It should enumerate the essentialia of a concept, but it should not enumerate its attributa, their essentialia and attributa, and so on. 29 essentialia. See, e.g., ÜE, AA 08: 299; V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24: 535. The second feature of definitions is completeness, and more precisely, extensive completeness. To say that a definition is extensively complete means to say that it enumerates all the essentialia of the defined concept. 30 The third feature of definitions is precision. The exposition of a concept is precise if no one of the marks it mentions is analytically entailed in another, 31 and if it does not mention any mark more than once. 32 A complete and precise exposition of a concept is called adequate. 33 Definitions are adequate expositions of concepts (or, as Kant sometimes writes, adequate concepts). An exposition of a concept which is not complete or precise is called a description. 34 The fourth feature of definitions is originality. The exposition of a concept is either original, or derived. The exposition of a concept is original if it mentions its essentialia. 35 If human being is an essentiale of philosopher, and rational is a mark of human being, an original exposition of philosopher will mention human being, but not rational. An exposition of philosopher which mentions rational will be derived. In fact, one can infer that philosophers are rational from the statement that philosophers are human beings. 36 30 By contrast, a definition should not be intensively complete. The exposition of a concept is intensively complete if it mentions all of its marks, including its essentialia and also its attributa. Definitions should not mention the attributa of the defined concept. A definition, considered as a sentence, should be true. A definition should not only indicate all essentialia of the definiendum in the most economical way. It should also avoid ascribing to the definiendum marks that it does not possess. 37 Finally, a definition should be a definition of an object. A distinct, complete, precise, original, and true exposition of a concept with an empty extension is not a definition in proper sense for Kant. He writes that "I can always define" concepts like mermaid, which result from the arbitrary combination of features of experienced objects. In this case, however, "from the concept I do not even know whether it has an object, and my explanation could better be called a declaration (of my project) than a definition of an object" 38 . Elsewhere, Kant states that only real definitions, that is, definitions of concepts with a non-empty extension, are definitions in proper sense. 39 Nominal definitions are actually only descriptions, that is, incomplete or imprecise definitions of concepts. 40 We have seen that definitions are extensively distinct, complete, precise, original, and true expositions of concepts. In addition, at least one object must fall within the extension of the defined concept. 
Nominal Definitions and Real Definitions
Kant usually illustrates what nominal definitions are by contrasting them with real definitions. Two contrapositions between nominal definitions and real definitions are important to understand Kant's claim that the agreement formula is the nominal definition of truth. Firstly, nominal definitions explain the meaning of words. Real definitions illustrate the essence of things. Secondly, nominal definitions do not provide any test to distinguish items which fall under the defined concept from those which do not. Real definitions provide such a test. Words express concepts and refer to things. 41 Words are not symbols, whose shape (in the case of written words) or sound (in the case of spoken words) reproduces features of things. 42 They are "signs which contain nothing at all belonging to the intuition of the object" 43 . This implies that the link between words and concepts is not natural, but arbitrary.
Definitions of Names and Definitions of Things
Words do not express the whole of our concepts. Words express the logical essence of concepts:
These all are the essentialia of the word [sic] matter, and consequently taken together they constitute the logical essence of it. 44 For Kant, so to say, concepts are in the head: they are mental entities, and their content depends on people's thoughts. People sometimes associate the same word with concepts which have differing intensions. "Thus with the concept of gold one person might think, besides its weight, color, and ductility, or its property of not rusting, while another might know nothing about this". 45 The content of a concept can also change across time: "[o]ne makes use of certain marks only as long as they are sufficient for making distinctions; new observations, however, take some away and add some" 46 . People can refine their concepts through empirical research and introspection.
The concept that a particular person associates with a certain word is what we would call a speaker's meaning of that word. Let us call the concept that people usually associate with a certain word its literal meaning. What Kant calls the meaning of a term is not its speaker's meaning, but rather its literal meaning. In fact, Kant writes that "common usage […] establishes the meaning of words" 47 . Therefore, the meaning of the word "truth" reflects people's ordinary conception of truth.
Everybody One who associated a word with a concept fully different from the concept that people usually associate with that word would violate the tacit convention which fixes the meaning of that word. Often, the content of our concepts does not reflect all basic properties of the things which fall within their extension. This is the case for empirical concepts and a priori concepts.
Kant, like Locke, holds that humans cannot know the essence of material objects. 49 We know only some of their features, which are sufficient to identify those objects and to distinguish them from other objects we have come across so far. Our concepts of material objects mention only those features. They do not describe the real essence of material objects.
There are other problems with regard to concepts given a priori, like substance, cause, god, soul, and equity. Let us consider the example of cause. For Kant, objects of experience entertain causal relations insofar as we apply the concepts of cause and consequence to the data of sensibility. Causal relations depend, at least in part, on the application of the concepts of cause and consequence to the data of sensibility. Features of causal relations are instantiations of the marks of the concept of cause. However, we acquire and apply the concept of cause in ways which do not require an awareness of its content. 50 We might be only partially aware of the content of the concept of cause. Our concept of cause "can contain many obscure representations, which we pass by in our analysis though we always use them in application" 51 . The basic marks that we individuate in the concept of cause can differ from the basic marks that a complete analysis of the concept of cause would reveal, and, consequently, from the basic features of causal relations. 52 "numus" (coin) from the ancient Greek "nomos" (law). The link between a word and the concept it expresses has the value of an inviolable law [Gesetz] and logical essences is arbitrary, nominal definitions "contain the meaning that one wanted arbitrarily to give to a certain name" 55 or word. -Kant's sharp separation of logical essences from real essences, together with the impossibility of knowing real essences, implies that nominal definitions do not enable one to "have better insight into the thing itself" 56 . They do not reveal the essence of things, which cannot be known, and they do not reveal those marks of a priori concepts that we overlooked in our analysis. They do not yield any information about objects which is not contained in our concepts. In effect, unless they stipulate the meaning of a new term, nominal definitions are analytic judgements, 57 whereas only synthetic judgements enlarge knowledge. 58 If Kant's view is correct, then we find ourselves in the following position. Nominal definitions illustrate the content of the concepts associated with certain words. The extension of a concept is determined by its content. It is the set of the objects which have the features designated by the marks of the concept. As a consequence, nominal definitions indicate features which the objects that fall within the extension of the defined concepts actually possess. As Kant's nominal definition of truth is "truth is the agreement of a cognition with its object", true judgements do agree with their objects.
On the other hand, in many cases, the features that nominal definitions indicate are not essential features of the objects which fall under the defined concepts. Something other than conceptual analysis is required to disclose the essential features of water, space, causal relationships, and maybe even the essence of truth. This could be empirical research, or an inquiry into the a priori conditions of human knowledge. If we want to get as close as possible to knowing the essence of water, we do not have to analyse our concept of water, but engage in empirical research. If we want to know the features of space, we have to inquire into the conditions of possibility of experience and geometry. Only this inquiry can enable us to know that space is a form of intuition, 59 and this is a fundamental feature of space according to Kant. Similarly, an analysis of the a priori conditions of empirical knowledge might disclose important features of true judgements about empirical objects, which are not contained in our concept of truth.
Nominal Definitions, Real Definitions, and Criteria of Application
In Kant's view, real definitions provide criteria for distinguishing items which fall under the defined concept from items which do not. Nominal definitions do not provide such criteria.
According to the Critique of Pure Reason, a real definition "contains in itself a clear mark by means of which the object (definitum) can always be securely cognized, and that makes the defined concept usable in application" 60 . Kant holds that real definitions mention all the essential features of the items which fall under the definiendum. For instance, the real definition of gold (provided it is possible to formulate it 61 ) lists all the essential features of gold. An item is made of gold if and only if it has all the features which are listed in the real definition of gold. Therefore, the real definition of concept a provides a sort of checklist that we can employ to establish whether any given item is an item of kind a. The real definition of gold enables one to distinguish real gold from fool's gold, and from any other item which is not gold. The real definition of water enables one to distinguish terrestrial water from Twin Earth water, and from any other substance which is not really water.
Nominal definitions do not provide any criterion for the application of the defined concepts. "Nominal definitions can be only comparatively sufficient. By means of them one cannot distinguish the thing from all possible things, but one [can] certainly [do this] through the marks which, taken together, make up the whole essence". 62 "Only those marks which, taken together, constitute the whole essence of the thing can suffice absolutely [to distinguish the thing from all possible other things], for the whole essence of the thing cannot be -common to two things. 59 See, e.g., Prol, AA 04: 322.02. 60 "[…] ein klares Merkmal, daran der Gegenstand (definitum) jederzeit sicher erkannt werden kann, und den erklärten Begriff zur Anwendung brauchbar macht, in sich enthält" (A 241 n.; transl. modified). And this is a real definition". 63 "Should a definition contain the difference from all possible concepts […] . Then it should be nominal and also real definition". 64 From these quotations, it follows that the nominal definition of gold might not suffice to tell real gold from fool's gold. The nominal definition of water might not suffice to tell terrestrial water from Twin Earth water. Only real definitions indicate marks which suffice to distinguish the objects falling under the defined concept from any other possible object. 65 What are the limits of the discriminatory capacity of nominal definitions? They could discriminate objects which fall under the defined concepts from all other objects we got to know so far, or from the objects we usually encounter in our experience. A marginal annotation to the Logic Bauch supports the first hypothesis. 66 The main text of the Logic Bauch is in line with the second hypothesis. 67 Kant does not seem to be concerned with explaining the precise limits of the discriminatory capacity of nominal definitions, but rather, with emphasizing the existence of those limits.
What Does It Mean To Say that the Agreement Formula is the Nominal Definition of Truth?
The analysis of the features of definitions, nominal definitions, and real definitions allows us to determine the meaning and implications of Kant's claim that the agreement formula is the nominal definition of truth.
The agreement formula illustrates the meaning of the predicate "is true". Nominal definitions explain the meaning of words. When competent speakers say that a judgement is true, they mean that it agrees with the object it is about. For Kant, meanings are arbitrary. Common linguistic usage arbitrarily established the meaning of "is true". If one gave a different meaning to "is true" (say, belonging to a maximally coherent set of beliefs, or being consistent with the laws of transcendental logic and being supported by the deliverances of the senses), one would diverge from common linguistic usage. Kant does not allow such a deviation: this would be tantamount to using "is true" in a wrong way. 68 The fact that Kant calls the agreement formula the nominal definition of truth does not mean or imply that he rejects the agreement formula. 69 As "judgement p is true" means "judgement p corresponds with the object(s) it is about", true judgements correspond with the objects they are about. 70 More precisely, all true judgements and only true judgements correspond with the objects they are about. "Truth is agreement of a cognition with the object it is about" is a true identity claim, unless further reflection proves the agreement formula to be inconsistent. Even if this were the case, the fact that the agreement formula is the nominal definition of truth would not mean or imply that it is false.
The only sense in which it is correct to say that Kant rejects the agreement formula is that he rejects it as a proper definition. For Kant, the agreement formula is only a nominal definition, as opposed to a real definition, and only real definitions are definitions in proper sense. 71 The concept of truth is analysable. The agreement formula is a nominal definition. Nominal definitions, like definitions in general, have the feature of distinctness: they make explicit which concepts jointly make up the content of the defined concept. 72 Accordingly, the nominal definition of truth indicates marks of the concept of truth. If the concept of truth has marks, it will not be primitive, simple, and unanalysable, as Kant's contemporary Johann Heinrich Lambert and, more recently, Donald Davidson claimed. 73 68 See Capozzi: Kant e la logica. Vol. 1, 503. 69 Contra the scholars cited at n. 6. 70 Kant generally uses the verb "to agree" (übereinstimmen), rather than "to correspond".
I used "to correspond" because Kant's Übereinstimmung is a truth-making relation between objects and judgements, and such a relation is normally called correspondence in the literature on truth. It is not a relation of coherence, because coherence holds between semantically evaluable items, yet objects are not semantically evaluable for Kant. On his use of "Übereinstimmung" and related terms, see Nenon, Thomas: "Limitations of a Co- Given Kant's view, a correct analysis of the concept of truth will break it down into four other concepts: agreement, cognition, object, and aboutness, because the nominal definition of truth is: truth is the agreement of a cognition with the object it is about. 74 Similarly, if the nominal definition of bachelor is "a bachelor is an adult, unmarried male", a correct analysis of the concept of bachelor will break it down into three concepts: adult, unmarried, and male. However, the way the concepts of agreement, cognition, object, and aboutness are combined into the concept of truth is remarkably different from the way the concepts of adult, unmarried, and male are combined into the concept of bachelor. The concept of bachelor derives from a sort of conjunction of the concepts of adult, unmarried, and male. To say that x is a bachelor is just to say that x is male, adult, and unmarried. By contrast, to say that x is true is not to say that x is an agreement, a cognition, an object, and that there is something x is about. The concept of truth involves a relation among the notions of agreement, cognition, object, and aboutness, which is more complex than a conjunction: to say that a cognition x is true is to say that there is an object o, such that x is about o, and that a relation of agreement holds between x and o. Gottlob Frege and Rainer Stuhlmann-Laeisz suggested that Kant's doctrine of complex concepts as combinations of marks is only tailored for concepts like bachelor, which derive from the conjunction of other concepts. They held that Kant's doctrine of complex concepts does not allow for a persuasive treatment of relational concepts, like those of agreement, aboutness, and possibly of truth. 75 I will not attempt to answer this question here, nor will I illustrate the notions of agreement, cognition, object, and aboutness which are related to truth. A lengthy discussion of many Kantian texts would be necessary to explain those notions.
The agreement formula is informative, at least in the following sense. The agreement formula is not a tautology of the form "a is b", where b is a lexical variant of a, or exactly the same term as a. "Corresponds to its object" is not just a lexical variant of "is true", a sort of fused idiom, whose difference from "is true" would only be a stylistic one. 76 The agreement formula provides information on the content of the concept of truth. 77 "Truth is the agreement of a cognition with the object it is about" spells out the content of the concept of truth by means of the concepts of agreement, cognition, object, and aboutness. Thus, for Kant, the expression "corresponds to its object" is more richly articulated than "is true". By contrast, A tautology like "a is b", where b is identical to a or it is a lexical variant of a, does not give any perspicuous description of the content of the concept expressed by a. It is uninformative. 78 The agreement formula illustrates people's ordinary conception of truth. Nominal definitions illustrate the meaning of words. The meaning of a word is the logical essence of the concept that people usually associate with that word. Hence, for Kant, people usually think that truth is the agreement of a cognition with its object. 79 Transcendental philosophy could prove that this conception is superficial or unsatisfactory, and it could yield a better characterization of truth. Even if this were the case, Kant's nominal definition of truth would still be the agreement formula.
The property of truth could consist in something more than what the agreement formula states. If the real essence of water is H 2 O, and nobody knows it, the content of the concept of water could be something like "colorless, tasteless, and odorless liquid". However, one will better characterize the property of being water by saying that water is H 2 O. Thomas Scanlon offered an account of the property of moral wrongness which implies a divergence between this property and the concept of moral wrongness. 80 William P. Alston suggested that there could be a similar divergence between the concept of truth and the property of truth. The concept of truth "is embodied in the T-schema: The proposition that p 78 Incidentally, for several contemporary philosophers, sentences like "truth is correspondence to the facts" are uninformative and tautological. is true if and only if p" 81 . The property of truth might be best captured by a relation of correspondence. 82 Kant's identification of the agreement formula with the nominal definition of truth leaves space for a similar divergence between the concept and the property of truth. The agreement formula captures people's ordinary conception of truth. Transcendental inquiry could prove that another definition of the property of truth should be preferred: for instance, because it employs more basic concepts, or because "object" should be defined by means of the concept of truth, and hence it cannot be used in the definition of truth. In this case, true judgements would still agree with their objects. Yet truth would be better described in other terms (e.g., as coherence with the deliverances of the senses and the laws of transcendental logic). In this case, the property of truth could consist in something more than what the agreement formula says.
The fact that Kant considers the agreement formula the nominal definition of truth does not imply that he adheres to a correspondence theory of truth. 83 He might prefer another theory, such as a coherence theory. In order to have a correspondence theory of truth, Kant should provide an account of the truth-bearers, of the truth-makers, and of the correspondence relation. His texts should provide answers to questions like the following: are the truth-bearers propositions, sentences, or utterances? Do true judgements correspond to phenomenal objects, noumenal objects, or facts? Is correspondence a relation between items in the world and the truth-bearers as a whole, or single parts of the truth-bearers (say, their subject and predicate)? If all Kant had to say about truth and correspondence were that the agreement formula is the nominal definition of truth, this would be far from enough to have a full-blooded account of truth in terms of correspondence. It would hardly deserve the name of a correspondence theory of truth.
To conceive of truth as depending on a genuine correspondence relation, Kant should choose items which are not truth-bearers as truth-makers. According to the current linguistic practice, a truth-making relation between a truth-bearer and other truth-bearers is called identity, coherence, or verification, but not correspondence. Any attempt of calling a relation between truth-bearers "correspondence" amounts to endorsing an identity theory, a coherence theory, or a verificationist theory, and just changing its name. 84 Moreover, Kant shall have a correspondence theory of truth only if his definition or most perspicuous explanation of what the truth-makers are does not employ or presuppose the concept of truth. For instance, if Kant takes objects as truth-makers, he should not define an object as that whose existence is entailed by a true judgement. Otherwise, the agreement formula could provide at most an explication of the notion of object on the basis of the notion of truth, but not an explication of the notion of truth on the basis of the notion of object, on pain of circularity.
Finally, to be a correspondence theorist, Kant should choose as correspondence the same relation for every true judgement. Otherwise, truth would consist in something different for different sorts of judgements. In this case, it would be more appropriate to say that one has two different theories of truth, that which is sometimes called a pluralist theory of truth, rather than a single, unified correspondence theory. 85 One more feature of nominal definitions is relevant for Kant's claim that the agreement formula is the nominal definition of truth: nominal definitions, differing from real definitions, do not yield any criterion for the application of the defined concept. Accordingly, the nominal definition of truth does not provide any criterion for discriminating true judgements from false judgements. Kant explains at some length why the agreement formula does not provide any criterion of truth in the Introduction to Transcendental Logic in the Critique of Pure Reason, so I will not dwell on this point. 86 Summing up, Kant's claim that the agreement formula is the nominal definition of truth is not sufficient to prove that he had a correspondence theory of truth, or that he rejected it. It does not imply that Kant considered the agreement formula irrelevant or platitudinous either. The agreement formula is a genuine explanation of the meaning of the predicate "is true" and of people's ordinary conception of truth. True judgements agree with the objects they are about. However, claiming this is not sufficient to have a correspondence theory of truth.
